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Abstract-This paper addresses the design of additive fingerprints that are maximally resilient against linear collusion attacks on a focused correlation detector, as defined below. Let be the length of the host vector and + 1 the number of users.
The focused detector performs a correlation test in order to decide whether a user of interest is among the colluders. Both the fingerprint embedder and the colluders are subject to squared-error distortion constraints. We show that simplex fingerprints maximize a geometric figure of merit for this detector. In that sense they outperform orthogonal fingerprints but the advantage vanishes as . They are also optimal in terms of minimizing the probability of error of the focused detector when the attack is a uniform averaging of the marked copies followed by the addition of white Gaussian noise. Reliable detection is guaranteed provided that the number of colluders . Moreover, we study the probability of error performance of simplex fingerprints for the focused correlation detector when the colluders use nonuniform averaging plus white Gaussian noise attacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION

P
ROTECTION of digital property is an emerging need in light of the proliferation of digital media and communication systems. Digital fingerprinting is an important class of techniques devised for traitor tracing. In our view of digital fingerprinting, copyright protection is implicitly achieved by deterring users from illegally redistributing the digital content. Unlike watermarking where only one copy of the marked signal is circulated, in digital fingerprinting each user is provided with his own individually marked copy of the content. Although this makes it possible to trace an illegal copy to a traitor, it also allows for users to collude and form a stronger attack. One such attack is averaging the colluders' copies and then adding noise to create a forgery. The averaging reduces the power of each fingerprint and makes the detector's task harder.
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N. Kiyavash attacks on a focused correlation detector. We optimize fingerprint constellations of size , where is the length of the host vector. In our problem setup, the detector has access to the host signal (nonblind detection) and performs a binary hypothesis test to verify whether a user of interest is colluding. We call this detector focused because it only tests for a specific user and not for all users. A simple correlation detector is assumed, and no claim is made regarding the optimality of this structure.
Collusion-resistant fingerprints have been developed for various types of data, including binary sequences [1] and vectors in -dimensional Euclidean spaces [2] - [5] . According to Kilian et al. [4] , randomly generated Gaussian fingerprints can survive collusion of up to users, where is the total number of fingerprints. The paper by Ergun et al. [5] shows that under some assumptions, any fingerprinting system with random fingerprints can be defeated by a collusion attack involving users. In the aforementioned papers, the attack is uniform averaging followed by addition of white Gaussian noise, and the detector returns the index of one guilty user. Of course, the kind of decision to be made by the detector impacts the collusion resistance. A harder problem for the detector, for instance, is to return a reliable list of all guilty users. An easier problem is to make a binary decision regarding the guilt of a specific user, as is the case in this paper.
Gaussian fingerprints were studied in [6] , where the authors present a game-theoretic analysis of the problem; the host signal, fingerprints, and attack channel are all assumed to be Gaussian, and all users are assumed to collude. The performance of orthogonal fingerprints was examined in [7] , where upper and lower bounds on the number of colluders that causes the detector to fail, are derived. The capacity of fingerprinting systems subject to arbitrary attacks under a mean-squared distortion constraint was given in [8] . Fig. 1 depicts a constellation with three equienergetic fingerprints . Fig. 1(a) depicts an asymmetric constellation while Fig. 1(b) -(d) correspond to various symmetric constellations. When the fingerprint constellation is symmetric, the parameter , the distance of the center of constellation from the origin, determines the type of constellation. For instance when , the resulting constellation is a simplex. One may ask whether either orthogonal or other constellation of fingerprints have any optimality property.
In this paper, we first prove that regular simplex fingerprints are optimal according to a geometric figure of merit, namely a certain minimum distance that determines performance of a correlation detector focused on a specific user, under the assumption of Gaussian averaging collusion attacks. Simplex fingerprints outperform orthogonal fingerprints but the performance gap vanishes for large . Second, we analyze simplex fingerprints from a detection-theoretic point of view, under the assumption of Gaussian averaging collusion attacks. We derive the probabilities of false positives and false negatives for the focused correlation detector and show that as long as the number of colluders , our detector is reliable. The reliability of the test is a function of the geometrical figure of merit derived in the first part of the paper.
A. Notation
Throughout this paper, we use uppercase letters to denote random variables, lowercase for their individual values, boldface for sequences, vectors, and matrices, and calligraphic fonts for sets. We denote by the cardinality of a set , by the Euclidean norm of a vector , and by the dot product of two vectors and . We use the symbol to denote mathematical expectation, and the asymptotic-equality notation to indicate that . We also write to indicate that .
B. Organization of the Paper
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we describe the attack channel and the notion of focused detector. In Section III, we compute an upper bound on the performance of a given constellation of fingerprints. Our main result is Theorem 2 of Section IV which states simplex fingerprints achieve the upper bound of Section III. In Section V, we study the performance of a simplex constellation against sizecoalitions, where number of colluders is less than the number of available fingerprints . In Section VI, we define our focused correlation detector and analyze its performance against the aforementioned class of attacks. In Section VII, we outline an extension of this framework to a joint watermarking/fingerprinting problem. Finally, our concluding remarks can be found in Section VIII.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The mathematical setup of the problem is diagramed in Fig. 2 . The host signal is a sequence in , to be marked and distributed to users, where . User is assigned a fingerprinted copy (1) where denotes the fingerprint assigned to user . The fingerprints have equal energy (2) where is the average distortion per sample introduced by the fingerprint designer.
From (1) and (2), we obtain
To simplify the analysis in Sections II-V, we restrict the attack channel to collusion between a subset of users in form of uniform average of their marked signals, followed by addition of a noise sequence . The output of the attack is a pirated copy, or forgery (4) where , the coalition, is the index set of the colluding users. We denote the number of colluders by . The noise sequence is drawn independently of from a probability distribution function with zero mean. We model as a white zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance . The host signal is available at the detector and thus can be subtracted from . The mean-squared distortion of the forgery relative to the host signal is given by (5) where is the average distortion per sample introduced by the coalition. The noise variance depends on the size of the coalition , and may not exceed . Definition 1: The noise-free forgery is the part of that does not depend on the noise . From (4), it is given by the average of the colluders' fingerprints (6) The detector performs a binary hypothesis test determining whether a certain user's mark is present in .
We shall study geometric properties of the fingerprints . Since the total number of fingerprints is , it is convenient to represent them in an -dimensional subspace. The detection statistic is obtained by orthogonal projection of the vector onto the -dimensional subspace spanned by and normalizing this projection by the scaling factor . 1 The resulting projection statistic (7) can be represented by an -dimensional vector. The normalization is introduced because it is convenient to work with vectors of unit norm when studying geometric properties of constellations. 1 If the dimension of span fQ g is less than M, then we can choose an arbitrary M-dimensional embedding of the subspace containing fQ g . If M = N or M = N + 1, the projection operator is the identity. Applying the map to the noise-free part of and recalling (6), we have (8) where has unit energy (9) We refer to as the constellation of fingerprints on the -dimensional unit sphere.
The detector we study aims at determining whether a certain user's mark is present in the forgery . We shall call this detector focused. It does not aim at identifying all colluders. Note that when fingerprinting schemes are designed to work in conjunction with law enforcement, catching one member of the coalition may eventually result in identifying all other colluders.
The focused detector performs a binary hypothesis test which returns a guilty or not guilty verdict for the user it is focused on. Assume the detector is focused on user and applies the detection rule to the centered data . (In this paper, a correlation detector will be used.) Let denote the hypothesis that user is innocent and the hypothesis that he is guilty . The possible error events are a false positive (falsely accusing when he is innocent) and a false negative (declaring innocent when he is guilty). The probability of these two events generally depends on the fingerprint constellation , the user , detection rule , and the attack . We denote the false-positive (or type I) and false-negative (or type II) error probabilities by (10) Before analyzing these error probabilities (in Section VI), we find it convenient to first analyze the geometrical properties of the constellation. To illustrate the binary hypothesis test at the detector, we present an example with three users.
Example 1: Consider a constellation of three users with fingerprints . Assume the detector wants to decide whether user 1 is guilty. Any combination of fingerprints in which is present in the noise-free forgery (8) implies that user 1 was one of the colluders. All possible noise-free forgeries involving user 1 appear in the left column of Table I . On the other hand, if user 1 is not colluding, the noise-free forgery (8) must be one of the entries of the right column. Fig. 3 depicts the constellation and the corresponding collusion points.
The entries of the table are vectors in . The vectors in the left column form a set corresponding to the guilty hypothesis. The vectors that correspond to a not-guilty assumption form the set . For a fixed user , let (11) be the distance between the sets and , e.g., is the smallest distance among the six possible distances between entries in the left and right columns of Table I .
Definition 2: Any pair of points in achieving the minimum distance in (11) is called a worstcase pair of noise-free forgeries for user .
In channel coding problems, it is common to judge a constellation by its minimum distance [9] , [10] . Here we do not have a full decoding problem but a binary hypothesis test. The natural geometric figure of merit for a detector focused on user is . Moreover, the error probability formulas we will derive are exact, unlike conventional coding problems where exact calculation of error probability is untractable.
A good constellation must perform well irrespective of which user is of interest to the detector. It is thus reasonable to choose a constellation that has the overall largest minimum distance. More precisely, we call (12) the minimum distance of the constellation . We wish to choose that maximizes . Since all users are potential colluders, we may have . Definition 3: Let be a maximizer of and the corresponding maximum. The fingerprints obtained from are called geometrically optimal fingerprints (GOF).
Next we show that GOF constellations can be found for any number of users.
III. GEOMETRICALLY OPTIMAL FINGERPRINTS
In this section, we derive an achievable upper bound for minimum distance of (12) . Let denote the unit sphere in . The centroid of a constellation is defined as . We first derive a sufficient condition for points on the sphere to maximize the sum of their mutual squared distances. Moreover, if equality holds for some constellation , the centroid of must be at the origin. Proof: See Appendix B.
IV. -SIMPLEX FINGERPRINTS
In this section, we formally define -simplex fingerprints. These fingerprints have their centroid at the origin and, therefore, are GOF.
An -simplex, sometimes called a hypertetrahedron, is the generalization of a tetrahedral region of space to dimensions. An -simplex has vertices. If all the 1-faces (polytope edges) in the simplex are equal, it is regular [11] . In one dimension, the regular simplex is the line segment . In two dimensions, the regular simplex is the equilateral triangle. In three dimensions, the regular simplex is the regular tetrahedron. The regular simplex in four dimensions (the pentatope) is obtained from the regular tetrahedron by choosing a point along the fourth dimension through the center of so that . Similarly, one can recursively construct a regular -simplex from a regular ( )-simplex, by choosing a new vertex along the th dimension through the centroid of the existing ( )-simplex, such that the new vertex is at equal distance from all the vertices of the ( )-simplex. It is convenient to describe a simplex in barycentric coordinates. The vertices of the simplex in barycentric coordinates can be expressed as There exists a planar graph representation for -simplices [12] . Fig. 4 depicts the complete graph corresponding to two and five simplices.
Regular -polytopes and thus the regular -simplex may be inscribed in centered -spheres; the smallest such sphere is called the circumsphere. In fact, there is an -sphere touching the centers of all the elements bounding the -polytope: vertices, edges, faces, and polyhedra.
This property is essential for us. By the power constraint , our fingerprints are to lie on the -dimensional unit sphere.
Lemma 2: Under the uniform linear averaging attack of (4), when the fingerprints are chosen as the vertices of the -simplex inscribed inside the unit sphere and the detector is focused on user , the worst-case noise-free forgeries are given by the pair and the corresponding distance by (13) Proof: See Appendix C. Theorem 2: Under the linear averaging attack of (4), the vertices of the -simplex inscribed inside the unit sphere form a GOF constellation for users. Proof: In light of Lemma 2, all the distances , are equal to and the upper bound of Theorem 1 is tight.
V. SIZE-COALITIONS
Although the minimum distance of (12) is our basic figure of merit for constellation design, generally not all users are colluders. We therefore derive a geometrical figure of merit when at most out of potential colluders form the attack. That is, . Table II shows the modification of the sets and of Example 1 when the coalition has size . Similarly to (11) , the minimum distance between the two sets and is
We shall next show that the worst-case noise-free forgeries are given by the pair (15) where is any size set of users that include user . Note that the forgery includes all the users present in the coalition except user , i.e., there are only colluders contributing to . Lemma 3: Under the uniform linear averaging attack (4), and the assumption that at most users collude, for the simplex fingerprints and a detector focused on user , the worst-case noise-free forgeries are given by (15) , and the corresponding distance for any coalition of size by (16) Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, for any fixed number of colluders , the minimum squared distance between the two general forgeries corresponding to user guilty and not guilty is the same as (72): . Minimizing this expression over subject to the constraint , we obtain . Therefore, the worst-case noiseless forgeries are given by (15) , and(16) follows from(72).
VI. PROBABILITY-OF-ERROR ANALYSIS
The minimum distance is a geometric figure of merit for fingerprint constellations. From a detection standpoint, however, the most natural performance criterion is probability of error. Moreover, was derived under the assumption that the coalition forms an average of their copies with uniform weights. In this section, we study the detection theoretic performance of simplex fingerprints against a larger class of linear attacks of the form (17) where is an independent identically distributed Gaussian noise vector independent of the signal and the fingerprints . Also , are arbitrary nonnegative weights summing to 1, so that the distortion is independent of . The uniform averaging attack (4) is a special case of this linear attack where for all . Similar to (8) , applying the map to the noise-free part of in (17), we have
For a unit-energy size-simplex fingerprint constellation, we have [13] .
Note that from (5), we have (20) By symmetry of simplex constellation , from (19), only depends on the number of colluders and is given by (21) where the second equality follows from (19) and the identity . Combining (20) and (21), we obtain (22) Next we study the detector and derive its error probabilities for the linear attack of (17).
A. Focused Correlation Detector
A special choice for the decision rule is the correlation detector which evaluates the correlation between the projection statistic of (7) and the fingerprint and compares the correlation statistic against a threshold (23)
The decision boundary for this test is a hyperplane normal to the vector (24) For the correlation detector of (23) focused on user , the decision rule is simply parameterized by the threshold . A typical (Neyman-Pearson type) choice for would be one that guarantees a maximum probability of false positives, as elaborated below.
B. Probability-of-Error Analysis
The attack of (17) is completely characterized by the coalition and the weight vector . Therefore, the false-positive and false-negative probabilities of (10) can be expressed as (25) where denotes the fingerprint constellation and the probabilities are taken with respect to the colluders' noise .
The worst-case type-I (over all coalitions and all innocent users) and type-II (over all coalitions and the most vulnerable guilty user) error probabilities are (26) (27) We show next that for the correlation detector of (23) and when the fingerprints are chosen from a simplex constellation, uniform averaging is the strongest among the linear attacks of (17).
C. Optimal Linear Attack Against Correlation Detector
Denote by the function. Then, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Let the maximum size of the coalition be , and the detector be the correlation detector of (23). The type-I and type-II error probabilities under the linear weighted attack of (17) with weight vector corresponding to the coalition are given by (28) (independent of ) and (29) where denotes a simplex constellation, and . The optimal attack consists of a coalition of maximum size with uniform weights, resulting in in (29). Proof: Assume the detector is focused on user and a coalition of size is in effect. The collection of feasible noisefree forgeries is composed of two sets: the guilty set corresponding to the guilty hypothesis and the not-guilty set corresponding to the alternative. Each set is the convex hull of . Recall that under the guilty hypothesis and otherwise. Let denote a forgery that involves user and a forgery that does not
For the forgery , we have
Similarly, for the forgery , we have
For any choice of , we also have
The type-I error probability (26) is given by (34) which establishes (28). The type-II error probability (27) is
where (37) with equality for some . Therefore,
which establishes (29). Note that because the simplex constellation is symmetric the value of only depends on the weight vector and not on . Hence the maximization over was dropped after (35).
Maximizing (38) over , we obtain
Clearly (40) where the minimum is achieved by uniform-weight vector. Moreover, the minimum over is achieved by . Note that the type-I error probability of (34) is independent of . Therefore, the colluders never gain by deviating from a sizeuniform averaging among the class of linear attacks of (17).
D. Neyman-Pearson Optimality of Regular Simplex Against Uniform Linear Averaging Attack
In this section, we prove that when the colluder's attack is uniform linear averaging plus white Gaussian noise, the simplex constellation is optimal in a Neyman-Pearson sense. First, we define some useful notation and quantities.
For a constellation and the detector of (23) focused on user , define • Noise-free forgery (41)
• Projection of onto (42) Since , we have . Furthermore, define (43) Proposition 2: For the correlation detector of (23) subject to the uniform linear averaging attack of (4), the type-I and type-II error probabilities for the simplex constellation are given by (44) and (45) There exists no other constellation that simultaneously yields a lower and a lower . Proof: For any constellation , the worst-case type-I and type-II error probabilities of (26) and (27) 
and (52) where (a) follows from (50). The simplex constellation is the only one that satisfies all the inequalities above with equality. It is, therefore, the unique maximizer of over the set of all possible constellations . We obtain (53) Substituting these expressions into (46) and (47) yields (44) and (45).
E. Minmax Probability of Error
In Section VI-C, we showed that for averaging plus white Gaussian noise attack, the coalition does worse in terms of error probability when they use a linear attack with nonuniform weights. Recall that in this framework the threshold trades off type-I and II error probabilities. To see the relevance of our geometrical figure of merit in this context, assume the detector knows and adopts the minmax threshold , which minimizes over (54) where is the uniform weight vector for a coalition of size . By symmetry of the distribution of the test statistic under and , the minmax threshold is equal to
Here and are given by (31) and (32), respectively, with . Combining (44), (45), (55), and (54), we obtain (56) where (57) The distance that determines the minmax error probability is proportional to the geometric figure of merit in (16) . Moreover, is proportional to and converges to a constant value (from above) as . Also as . Since , the error exponent for the test is
Recall that for positive . The last equality in (58) was obtained using the asymptotic equality as . It is noteworthy that tends to zero as the number of colluders . Still tends to infinity, provided , in which case the error probability in (56) tends to zero. When is of the order of , converges to a constant and converges to a nonzero value as . Also note that the minmax error probability for orthogonal fingerprints is given by with , slightly worse than the distance of (57). The detector is able to use the threhold (55) if it knows . If it does not, then some nonlinear detector could be used, where is estimated from , and the estimate is plugged in (55). Error probability would result from two overlapping error events, one being the effect of the colluder's noise as studied above, and the other one being incorrect estimation of .
VII. WATERMARKING FINGERPRINTED DATA
Recall Fig. 1 where is the distance of the center of the constellation to the origin. We can interpret the vector of length connecting the origin to the center of the constellation as a watermark added to the host signal on top of the fingerprints. Even though fingerprinting schemes are devised for traitor tracing, it might be necessary to insert a separate watermark into the host signal in order to protect the ownership rights. For instance, if simplex fingerprints are used ( ) and all users collude ( ), then uniform linear averaging of the fingerprinted copies recovers the original host signal . This may be unacceptable and motivates a joint watermarking/fingerprinting scheme. Unlike the fingerprints that are unique for each user, the watermark is shared between all copies and is immune to any averaging attack. A natural choice for the watermark signal is to be orthogonal to the the span of the fingerprints:
. In general, we can express the joint fingerprinting and watermarking process as Thus, there is a tradeoff between the power allocated to the watermark and the power of the fingerprints . In view of Theorem 2 of Section IV, even in the presence of the watermark , the fingerprints still are chosen to be the vertices of an ( )-simplex in , but they are circumscribed to a smaller sphere.
As a special case, in the -dimensional space, by choosing , one can allocate the power between and the fingerprints such that the resulting fingerprints are orthogonal in . This is illustrated in Fig. 1(b) .
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this work, we assumed a linear averaging attack model followed by the addition of a noise vector independent of the input. We showed that fingerprints from a simplex constellation are optimal in sense of maximizing a minimum-distance criterion for size-fingerprint constellations, where and is the length of the host signal. Therefore, we have answered the question posed in the introduction, "One may ask whether either orthogonal or other constellation of fingerprints have any optimality property." The minimal distance achieved by simplex fingerprints (when all users are colluding) is . For large , this optimal distance converges to which is achieved by geometrically orthogonal fingerprints [7] , therefore, proving optimality of orthogonal constellations for large . We also studied the statistical performance of simplex fingerprints under Gaussian attacks on a focused correlation detector. We identified the most nefarious attack that colluders could launch in the class of linear attacks of (17). Specifically, we showed that the coalition does best in terms of maximizing the type-II error probability when they use linear attacks with uniform weights. Moreover, we studied the minmax error probability of the focused correlation detector and established a direct correspondence with the geometrical figure of merit . Following this study, a number of open questions remain. What would be the performance of the focused correlation detector against nonlinear attacks? (e.g., non-Gaussian or more generally, an arbitrary attack subject to a mean-squared distortion constraint). The reader is referred to [14] - [16] for recent results in this direction, and to [8] for the problem of full decoding (the decision is a list of accused users). Interestingly a joint decoder based on correlation statistics is capacity-achieving in the framework of [8] , and one may thus conjecture that some notion of asymptotic optimality holds for focused detectors based on correlation statistics. 
APPENDIX
From Lemma 1, is maximized when the fingerprints form a constellation with its centroid at the origin. Combining this result with (65), we obtain .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Assume that the detector is focused on user . Any forgery in which user takes part can be expressed by (66) where denotes the number of users that take part in the forgery, and is the set of the users in this forgery. Similarly, any forgery excluding user can be written as
where denotes the number of users that take part in the forgery and is the set of users in this forgery. Note that . Assume a total of users are shared between the two forgeries. The common set of users is denoted by . The distance between these forgeries is (68)
We can embed the fingerprints in an -dimensional space where they would be orthogonal and the distance of (68) remains unchanged with respect to this embedding. More specifically, we shall choose the origin of the new coordinate system along the orthogonal direction passing through the centroid of the simplex so that all the new fingerprints are still equienergetic. Denote the fingerprints in the new coordinate system by , where
Note that . Since the distance of (68) is invariant to the embedding, we have (69) For ease of computation, we shall work with . Note that the three sums in (69) do not share any common fingerprints. Since are orthogonal, the cross terms are zero, and we have
Given that the are orthogonal and of energy , we have (71) For fixed , the above expression is minimized for and (remember that the set does not include user ) and (72) The squared distance in (72) is minimized when , i.e., everyone is colluding. The worst-case noise-free forgeries are given by the pair .
